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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CITY ORDINANCE
REQURMING JITNE BUSSES TO EXECT Bumns.*
Fayette Circuit Court.
MMnmE J. Fox, ETC. . . . . . . Plaintiff,
vs.-Opinion of the Court.
CiTY OF LEXINGTON, ET A__. Defendants.
This action is submitted to me upon a motion for a tempo-
rary injunction to prevent the City of Lexington from enforcing
that portion of an ordinance enacted December 26, 1925, which
requires all persons operating a jitney bus over the streets of
Lexington on a fixed schedule to execute a bond to indemnify
against loss to any passenger who may be injured by the negli-
gence of the driver of the jitney bus.
Taxicabs charging twenty-five cents (25c) or more, hotel
busses and the like are exempted from the provisions of the
ordinance.
Plaintiffs attack the validity of the ordinance on two
grounds: (a) That it provides for an improper classification
in that it puts jitney busses in one class; and (b) because of the
premium required on the bond the operators can make no money.
Jitney busses are comparatively modern methods of trans-
portation, having sprung up in our cities because of modern
smooth surface streets, and because of the development of the
gasoline engine. They are common carriers and, of course, like
all common carriers, are subject to the police power of the State
and of the municipality. Section 3094 of the Statutes gives the
city exclusive control and power over the streets of the city;
and while the original source of power over the streets and high-
ways is in the State, yet the State may delegate this power to a
municipality, which has been done in cities of the second class.
Owensboro v. Cumberlaiid Telephone Co., 230 U. S. 58.
* This is the second of a series of certain of Judge Richard C.
Stoll's opinions rendered while Judge of the Fayette Circuit Court. In
many instances they discuss the constitutionality of statutes and ques-
tions of law not as yet passed upon by the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky. The Kentucky Law Journal is indebted to Mr. Gayle Mohney
who has assisted in selecting and editing them.
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The city is also given power to regulate vehicles using the
highway by Section 3058-2 of the Statutes. Commonwealth v.
Nolan, 189 Ky. 34.
In the Act known commonly as the Auto Transportation
Act, which will be found in Chapter 81 of the Acts of 1924, a
classification somewhat similar to the classification in the ordi-
nance in question is made. This Act was declared constitutional
by the Court of Appeals in a case originating in this court.
Reo Bus Lines Co. v. Southern Bus Line Co., 209 Ky. 40.
The provision for a bond in the ordinance is for the protec-
tion of the traveling public. Realizing that jitney busses may
be operated by people who might not be financially responsible,
whose only property is the bus, which may be heavily mortgaged,
the City of Lexington determined that these common carriers,
using the streets of Lexington, should protect in some way the
traveling public from the negligence of the operators of the
jitney bus. If the operators of the bus should be guilty of the
grossest negligence and by reason thereof injure or kill men,
women and children, then a judgment for a substantial amount
might be recovered against the owner or operator of the jitney,
and if he had no property the judgment -ould be worthless and
the injured party could recover nothing on the amount due to
him. Then, again, financial responsibility for carelessness or
negligence causes a person to be more careful, and it is to the
interest of the city and of its inhabitants that the owners or
operators of these common carriers be careful and prudent in
their operation. So the poition of the ordinance in question,
requiring the bond, is an exercise of the police power of the city.
The requirement of a bond is not a license tax.
The case of People v. Coolidge, Judge, 50 L. R. A. 493, cited
by plaintiffs, clearly points out the difference in the power
to enact ordinances, which come under the police power, and
those which do not. In that case a bond was required by per-
sons who sold farm produce. The court held that this could
not be done, for it was an unwarranted interference with the
rights of a citizen to carry on a legitimate business, and it could
find no support in the exercise of the police power of the city,
and the court says:
"It is not like the liquor traffic which, under the decisions
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CITY ORDINANCE
of the court, is subject to the police power. . Nor is there
anything in it requiring regulation as to hack drivers, peddlers,
pawn shops and the like."
The case of Reo Bus Lines Co. v. Southern Bus Line Co., 209
Ky. 40, seems to me to be decisive of the question raised in this
case. In that case the court said:
"The act is assailed as being class legislation, in that it
denies to certain persons the use of the highways unless they
secure a permit from the commission, and that it tends to create
a monopoly."
It is well established that a business affected with a public
use may be regulated by the state. 6 R. C. L. pages 224-228 and
notes.
The general principle applying to this class of cases is well
stated in Tiedman on Limitations, section 93, and quoted with
approval in Ky. T. & T. Co. v. Murray, 176 Ky. 593:
"'Whenever the business is itself a privilege or franchise not
enjoyed by all alike, or the business is materially benefited by gift by
the state of some special privileges to be enjoyed in connection with it,
the business ceases to be strictly private, and becomes a quasi public
business, and to that extent may be subjected to police regulations.'"
Public highways are public property, established, con-
structed and maintained at public expense for public use, and
naturally fall under governmental control.
Unquestionably in the exercise of the police power the
state may by general law regulate the use of such highways and
the character of vehicles operated thereon. This is done by
the state as agent for the people each and all of whom, subject
to such regulations, have an equal right in the ordinary use
and enjoyment of the highway.
But it was never contemplated that the highways should
form a part of the capital stock of common carriers engaged in
the transportation of persons or property for profit, or that
the use of the highways should be donated to them for that
purpose.
Clearly these companies have no vested or inherent right
in the highways, and their unrestrained use thereof is equivalent
to an appropriation of public property for private use, and it
is within the power of the legislature to prohibit this use or to
prescribe the terms upon which it may be exercised.
X. L. J.-ll
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In adopting the latter course the act does not impinge on
any constitutional provision. Green v. San Antonio (Tex.)
178 S. W. 6; Hfadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657; Catrona v.
Wilmington, 126 Atl. 658; Ex Parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576;
Gruber v. Commonwealth, 125 S. E. 427; Sheets Taxicab Co. v.
Commonwealth, 125 S. E. 431; Taylor v. Smith, 32 Va. 416;
Receiver v. District Court, 98 Atl. 92.
In most of these cases the validity of city ordinances was
attacked, the Sheets and Gruber cases applying directly to the
Virginia Transportation Act, which is essentially similar to the
one under consideration, but the same principle was involved in
all, some of the conclusions being thus expressed:
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and to trans-
port his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business
differs radically and obviously from one who makes the highway his
place of business and uses it for private gain in the running of a stage
coach or omnibus; the former is the usual and ordinary right of a citi-
zen, a common right, a right common to all, while the latter is special,
unusual and extraordinary." Ex parte Dickey.
"So in this case, appellant has never had any vested right to use
the streets of San Antonio to engage in the business of a common car-
rier of passengers for hire, and no right of his is infringed or invaded
by the ordinance requiring certain things to be done in order to enter
into business on the streets, which have at the expdnditure of large
sums been placed by the city in prime condition for automobile travel.
The streets belong to the public, the city being its trustee, and no
private individual or corportion has a right to use such streets for the
prosecution of a business without the consent of the trustee and the
compliance with the conditions upon which the permission to so use
them is given." Green v. San Antonio, 178 S. W. 6.
"The streets and highways belong to the public. They are built
and maintained at public expense for the use of the general public In
the ordinary and customary manner. The state and city, as an arm of
the state, has absolute control of the streets in the interest of public.
No private individual or corporation has a right to the use of the
streets in the prosecution of the business of a common carrier for
private gain without the consent of the state, nor except upon the
terms and conditions prescribed by the state or municipality as the
case may be. The use of the streets as a place of business is accorded
as a mere privilege and not as a matter of natural right.
. . . Since the use of the streets by a common carrier in the
prosecution of its business as such is not a right, but a mere license
or privilege, it, follows that the legislature may prohibit such use
entirely without impinging on any provisions either of the federal or
state Constitutions.
"If any proposition may be said to be established by authority the
right of the state in the exercise of its police power, prohibit the use
of the streets as a place of private business or as the chief instrumen-
tality in conducting such business must be held so established. Nor
can it be questioned that the power to prohibit includes the power to
regulate even to the extent that the regulation under given conditions
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may be tantamount to a prohibition." Haafteld v. Lundin, 98 Wash.
657.
"No man has the right to use the public streets as a place wherein
to carry on his private business. The streets are not constructed and
maintained by the public for the purpose of supplying sites and facili-
ties for carrying on private occupations. If it were otherwise vendors
of goods might with justice protest against all attempts to exclude them
from the streets in the prosecution of their various businesses, not-
withstanding the rights of the traveling public were being interferred
with and traffic thereby obstructed." Catrona v. Wilmington, 124 AtL
658.
We have been cited to no authority to the contrary and feel
sure that none exists. Aside from the principle above stated
of public ownership of highways and the resultant right of
governmental control, transportation companies included in the
act are common carriers subject in themselves to governmental
control, and taken in connection with the rapid development
of motor transportation and the number of private vehicles
using the same highways, governmental supervision is essential
for the protection both of the passengers of the transportation
companies and of the general public using the highways. The
patrons are entitled to regular schedules, fixed transportation
charges and safe equipages.
In the case of Auto Transit Co. v. Fort Worth, 182 S. W.
685, the court had before it for consideration an ordinance
similar to the ordinance in question, and it answers almost
every contention made by the plaintiffs in this action. The
whole case may be read with interest, but I will only make one
quotation from it:
"Nor does the fact that the plaintiffs herein are not in a
position to comply with the terms and provisions of the ordi-
nance under discussion, of itself, establish the invalidity or
unreasonableness of such ordinance. It is true that the provi-
sion requiring a surety bond may necessitate the incurrence of
an expense which the plaintiffs may not be able to bear, and
that therefore they will be required to abandon the operation of
their motor busses, but that in itself does not establish the n-
reasonableness or invalidity of the ordinance. Nor does the
fact that plaintiffs will suffer a pecuniary injury by reason of
the enforcement of said ordinance even tend to establish the
truth of the contention that the ordinance is invalid. As said
by Mr. Justice Brewer in the N. Y. & N. E. R. Co. Cases, cited
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in Grainger v. Jockey Club, 148 Fed. 513, 78 C. C. A. 199, 8
Ann. Cas. 997:
'The truth is that the exercise of the police power often works
pecuniary injury, but the settled rule of this court is that the mere
fact of pecuniary injury does not warrant the overthrow of legislation
of a police character.'
"In the Jacobson Case, 197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49
L. Ed. 643, Mx. Justice Harlan says:
'In every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving
the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his
liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected
to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the
safety of the general public may demand.'
"In the Barbier Case, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L.
Ed. 923, cited in the same opinion, Mr. Justice Field says:
'Though, in many respects, necessarily special in their character,
they (statutory regulations) do not furnish just ground of complaint
if they operate alike on all persons and property under the same cir-
cumstances and conditions. Class legislation, discriminating against
some and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carry-
ing out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the
sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is
not within the amendment.' Fourteenth Amendment, U. S. Constitu-
tion.
"In conclusion we desire to say that, so far as we have
been able to determine, the ordinance in question was authorized
under the general police powers with which the charter vested
the board of commissioners, as well as other charter provisions
hereinbefore mentioned, and that we cannot say that the ordi-
nance should be held invalid on any of the grounds urged, or
that it contains any unreasonable terms and conditions, or is
discrhninatory in its nature."
The ordinance which was before the court in Huston v.
Des Moines, 156 N. W., 883, was similar to the one in question,
and was sustained. In that case the court said:
"Coming now to the ordinance passed by the city council
in virtue of the statute, it is claimed the bond as fixed is pro-
hibitive. If a bond may be required at all for the purpose of
indemnifying the public, which, of course, means the individuals
going to make up that public, else it means nothing, it is per-
fectly apparent that the bond, rather than being excessive, is,
to say the least, inadequate in amount as compared with the
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damage which may be done any day through the carelessness of
an operator. If it results in keeping irresponsible people off
the street, it is not an unmixed evil. That it will have a ten-
dency to make drivers more careful in the operation of their
machines needs no argument, and that it may be beneficial to
the owner or operator himself is not beyond the pale of reason."
To the same effect see Memphis v. Tennessee, L. R. A. 1916
13, 1151, and Commonwealth v. Noland, 189 Ky. 34.
It was suggested by counsel in argument that jitney busses
are a public necessity. That they are of convenience to the
public is true, but safety and responsibility should never be
sacrificed to convenience. If the traffic on jitney busses is not
great enough to justify the payment of a comparatively small
premium on a bond for the convenience of the public, it can be
attributed to only two things-either the rate of fare is too low
or not enough of the public patronizes them to justify their
operation with safety to the public, and if this latter be true, if
not enough people ride on them to justify the small increased
expenditure for the bond, then, of course, they are not necessary
to the public, for if they were and the rate of fare charged was
adequate, then busses would earn enough to pay operating
expenses, premiums on bonds and a reasonable profit. If this
were not true, then the jitney bus is not as yet a practical
method of transportation.
In accordance with the principle announced in these cases,
supra, and particularly those announced in the case of Reo Bus
Lines Co. v. Southern Bus Line Co., supra, I am of the opinion
that the portion of the ordinance requiring the bond which is
before me, is constitutional and valid, and the temporary injunc-
tion will be refused.
The Clerk will make this opinion a part of the record.
RicuRD C. SToIL,
Judge.
